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ARGUMENT 
I. THE SCOPE OF APPELLANTS' APPEAL 
Appellee Mona Vincent Lunceford ("Mona") makes two arguments related to the 
scope of Appellants' appeal that need to be addressed at the outset. 
A. Appellants Have Appealed the District Court's Decision to Deny the 
Motion to Reconsider 
First, Mona argues that "Appellants failed to argue in their opening brief that the 
district court abused its discretion in denying their motion to reconsider, and therefore that 
issue is waived on appeal." See Mona's Br., at 1. This is simply not the case. On the very 
first page of Appellants' opening brief, Appellants set forth as "Appellate Issue No. 2" the 
following issue: "Whether the district court erred in refusing to reconsider its ruling granting 
Mona's Motion to Dismiss." See Aplt. Br., at 1. Appellants pointed out that the standard of 
review on this issue was "abuse of discretion" (which differed from the de novo standard on 
the related "Appellate Issue No. 1," which was whether the district court erred in granting the 
Motion to Dismiss in the first place). Mona chides Appellants for not restating Appellate 
Issue No. 2 explicitly in other places in their brief, but Appellants are unaware of a 
requirement that an issue, to be preserved on appeal, must be mentioned more than once in 
an appellate brief. 
In fact, the manner in which Appellants structured their brief was perfectly rational, 
and does not result in the waiver of any issue. Heading I in Appellants' brief was an 
argument that the "district court erred in determining that the Settlement Agreement can be 
unambiguously construed against Appellants." This argument goes to both Appellate Issue 
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No. 1 (whether the court properly granted the Motion to Dismiss, an issue that receives de 
novo review) and to Appellate Issue No. 2 (whether the court properly denied the Motion to 
Reconsider, an issue that draws review for abuse of discretion). Indeed, part of Appellants' 
argument centers around the Jeffs Affidavit (as opposed to Jeffs' letters or potential live 
testimony at the hearing), which did not even exist until the Motion to Reconsider. In their 
argument in their opening brief, Appellants point out the reasons why the district court erred 
in determining that the Settlement Agreement could be unambiguously construed against 
them, regardless of whether the standard of review is de novo or abuse of discretion. The 
mere fact that Appellants did not re-state the appellate issues and the appellate standards of 
review in their argument section, after already having stated them once, does not and cannot 
result in a waiver of any argument. 
B. Appellants Have Not Waived Issues Raised in Their Complaint,, But Not 
Germane to this Appeal or Decided by the District Court, By Not Raising 
Them in the Appeal 
Next, Mona asserts that Appellants have waived certain issues raised in their original 
Complaint by not including them in their appeal. However, the issues Mona points to are not 
germane to this appeal and were not decided by the district court. For instance, Mona claims 
that Appellants have waived issues raised in their Complaint regarding (1) who is the proper 
successor Trustee of the Trust, (2) whether the three 2001 documents that Mona produced 
only after Clyde was dead are authentic or are forgeries, (3) whether Mona has improperly 
used rental income, and (4) whether Appellants are entitled to damages from Mona. See 
Mona's Br., at 16. This argument misperceives both the scope of this appeal as well as the 
scope of the district court's decision below. 
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As Mona acknowledges, Appellants raised a host of issues in their Complaint, 
including the four mentioned above, and sought broad-ranging relief against Mona for her 
actions in relation to the Trust. See R. at 001-039. On Mona's motion, the district court 
dismissed Appellants' entire complaint on Rule 12(b)(6), because it determined that the 
Settlement Agreement was unambiguous and that, therein, Appellants waived any claims they 
might have regarding the Trust. See id. at 182-191. The district court did not make any 
determinations, findings, rulings, or decisions regarding the merits of the four issues set forth 
in the preceding paragraph; rather, the sole ground for the district court's dismissal of the 
Complaint was that it determined that Appellants had waived their claims. Id. at 183. 
One can appeal only what is actually decided by the district court, because appellate 
courts sit to review actual decisions of district courts. See, e.g.. In re Eric Peterson Constr.. 
951 F.2d 1175, 1182 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Singleton v. Wulff. 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976), 
and stating that "[i]t is the general rule that a federal appellate court does not consider an 
issue not passed upon below"); see also United States Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Midvale Home 
Fin. Corp.. 46 P.2d 672,673 (Utah 1935) (stating that "[w]e may not determine questions... 
not heard or determined by the trial court"). In view of this, Appellants' appeal rightly brings 
only those issues decided by the district court—whether the court was correct in determining 
that the Settlement Agreement unambiguously provides that Appellants waived their 
claims—to the attention of this Court on appeal. Indeed, it would have been improper for 
Appellants to have attempted to brief the other issues raised in the Complaint and not decided 
by the district court; in fact, Appellants suspect that if they had done so, Mona would be 
claiming that Appellants could not raise the issues because they had not been decided below. 
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Thus, the only issues properly presented to this Court on appeal are the ones that the 
district court actually decided. Appellants certainly have not waived any of their other 
arguments—not decided by the district court—by not including them in this appeal. If this 
Court agrees with Appellants that their claims were not waived, and reverses the district 
court's decision and remands the case for further proceedings, the result will be that 
Appellants' Complaint is reinstated in its entirety, regardless of whether Appellants raised 
in this appeal every issue raised in their Complaint. 
IL THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT CAN BE UNAMBIGUOUSLY CONSTRUED 
AGAINST APPELLANTS 
Turning to the merits of the appeal, the district court made two fundamental and 
reversible errors in this case, regardless of the standard of review used to examine those 
errors. The district court erred by, first, making the threshold determination that the 
Settlement Agreement is unambiguous without even considering relevant proffered evidence 
regarding the parties' intentions at the time of contracting, and, second, then proceeding to 
interpret that Agreement against Appellants as a matter of law in the context of a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion. Because both parties espouse differing yet apparently tenable 
interpretations of the Settlement Agreement's provisions, that Agreement is by definition 
ambiguous, and the district court's decision to ignore Appellants' interpretation of the 
Agreement, especially where that interpretation was supported by Appellants' allegations in 
the Petition and by the Jeffs Affidavit, was erroneous and must be reversed. 
A. Basic Rules of Contractual Interpretation 
In their initial brief, Appellants laid out the Utah Supreme Court's rules for 
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interpreting contracts: in a nutshell, that the touchstone of contractual interpretation is giving 
effect to the parties' intent, and a court may not limit its review of a document to its four 
corners, even if the court believes the document to be unambiguous, because the court's 
reading of the document may not be the one intended by the parties. The court must consider 
"any relevant evidence" offered by the parties bearing on the meaning of the document. Only 
if the court believes, after viewing and considering all relevant evidence, that the document 
is and remains unambiguous, may the court proceed to interpret the document as a matter of 
law on a Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56 motion. See Aplt. Br., at 18-23 (citing cases). 
Mona takes issue with Appellants' recitation of the rules of contractual interpretation, 
claiming that "Appellants' view . . . is hopelessly circular and impractical; whatever else, 
Utah law can't mean that." See Mona's Br., at 24. In support of her criticisms, Mona cites 
to a recent Tenth Circuit opinion in which Judge McConnell remarks that, in his view, "Utah 
law is unsettled on the issue." See Flying J. Inc. v. Comdata Network, Inc.. 405 F.3d 821, 
831 (10th Cir. 2005), petition for cert, filed. 74 USLW 3303 (Oct. 31, 2005) (No. 05-582). 
Judge McConnell's conclusions are based on contrasting cases (such as Ward v. 
Intermountain Farmers Ass'n. 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995)) that actually and squarely 
confronted the issue with other cases (such as WebBank v. Am. Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp.. 
2002 UT 88,54 P.3d 1139) that did not squarely confront the issue but rather contain passing 
references to pre-Ward case law. And in any event, Judge McConnell's non-binding views 
are, in the end, dicta, because he did not have to squarely confront the issue either in order 
to reach his decision in the case, in part because "both parties [in the Flying J case] 
follow[ed] the expansive view" and believed that settled Utah law required courts to look 
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beyond the four corners of a document in making threshold determinations regarding 
ambiguity. See Flying J. 405 F.3d at 831. 
In reality, the Flying J litigants (and not Judge McConnell) had the right answer. Utah 
law is not "unsettled" on the issue. The Utah Supreme Court squarely confronted this 
controversial issue, and squarely decided it in favor of the expansive view: 
When determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence 
must be considered. Otherwise, the determination of ambiguity is inherently 
one-sided, namely, it is based solely on the 'extrinsic evidence of the judge's 
own linguistic education and experience.' Although the terms of an instrument 
may seem clear to a particular reader—including a judge—this does not rule 
out the possibility that the parties chose the language of the agreement to 
express a different meaning. A judge should therefore consider any credible 
evidence offered to show the parties9 intention. 
See Ward. 907 P.2d at 268 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In reaching its conclusion, 
the Ward court cited favorably to other cases around the country that had effectively 
abolished the "plain meaning rule," see id. (citing to, inter alia, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. 
G.W. Thomas Dravage & Rigging Co.. 442 P.2d 641,644 (Cal. 1968), and C.R. Anthony Co. 
v. Loretto Mall Partners. 817 P.2d 23 8,242-43 (N.M. 1991)), and cited favorably to Professor 
Corbin's treatise, see id., which itself speaks favorably of the "trend toward abolishing the 
plain meaning rule" and cites G.W. Thomas and C.R. Anthony as having done just that, see 
5 Corbin on Contracts §24.7, at 39,41,48 (1998). In short, the Utah Supreme Court in Ward 
knew exactly what it was doing, and knew that its holding represented a departure from 
earlier case law. Indeed, the Ward court expressly adverted to the existence of contrary case 
law, and stated that: 
While there is Utah case law that espouses a stricter application of the rule and 
would restrict a determination of whether ambiguity exists to a judge's 
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determination of the meaning of the terms of the writing itself, the better-
reasoned approach is to consider the writing in light of the surrounding 
circumstances. 
See Ward, 907 P.2d at 268 (emphasis added). The decision in Ward drew two spirited 
dissents, one from then-Chief Justice Zimmerman and one from Justice Russon. Chief 
Justice Zimmerman noted that the decision represented "a clear departure from the long-
standing [plain meaning] rule," and expressed his opinion that this departure was unwise. Id. 
at 270-71 (Zimmerman, J., dissenting). Justice Russon foreshadowed the exact criticisms 
leveled by Mona in her brief, stating that the Ward majority "ignores well-settled precedent 
in favor of an approach that invites parties to create ambiguity in even the clearest contract 
provisions," and "upsets the expectations of contracting parties and litigation practices in 
contract disputes," and could result in every single contract-based litigation proceeding to 
trial rather than being decided on a motion. Id. at 270 (Russon, J., concurring in the result). 
Despite these criticisms, expressed fully and eloquently by the Ward dissenters, the 
Ward majority carried the day, and the rule announced in Ward is still good law. It has been 
followed many times by both this Court as well as the Utah Supreme Court. See Peterson v. 
Sunrider Corp.. 2002 UT 43, 1[19, 48 P.3d 918 (citing Ward, and stating that "[i]n 
determining whether a contract is ambiguous the court is not bound to consider only the 
language of the contract" and that "any relevant evidence must be considered"); Nielsen v. 
Gold's Gvm. 2004 UT 37, \1, 78 P.3d 600 (citing Ward and Peterson); Gillmor v. Macev. 
2005 UT App 351, TJ35 & n.14, 121 P.3d 57; Novell Inc. v. The Canopy Group. 2004 UT 
App 162, f 21,92 P.3d 768. Both Judge McConnell and Mona correctly point out that Utah's 
appellate courts have, in several instances since Ward announced the new rule, cited in 
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passing to pre-Ward cases enunciating the old rule. See Flying J. 405 F.3d at 831. However, 
these are merely passing references, and cannot be taken as authority that Ward did not mean 
what it says. 
The Utah Supreme Court has squarely addressed this issue, and has set forth careful 
(albeit new) rules for courts to use in interpreting contracts. Unfortunately, the message of 
Ward has not yet reached Mona or the district court, but the rule exists nonetheless. The rules 
of contractual interpretation, as set forth by Appellants in their opening brief, are correct and 
robust. The district court was required, under Ward and its progeny, to consider "any 
relevant evidence" in making its threshold determination that the Settlement Agreement was 
(or was not) ambiguous. 
B, Without Considering "Any Relevant Evidence," the District Court Made 
the Determination—On a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion—That the Settlement 
Agreement is Unambiguous 
The district court did not follow these basic rules in this case. The district court 
refused to consider "all relevant evidence" related to the intentions of the parties at the time 
of contracting, and instead limited its review merely to the four corners of the document. 
This alone was error. The district court then compounded the error by making a 
determination, without considering any of the proffered extrinsic evidence, that the 
Settlement Agreement was unambiguous and could be construed in Mona's favor as a matter 
of law. 
Mona defends the district court's actions by arguing that Appellants, during the 
Motion to Dismiss, "never presented extrinsic evidence to the trial court on the issue of 
ambiguity." See Mona's Br., at 26. But this is not true. As Appellants have already noted 
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in their initial brief, during the hearing on the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Appellants' counsel 
noted, on the record, the presence of Mr. Dayle Jeffs ("Jeffs") in the courtroom during the 
hearing, and informed the court that Jeffs was prepared to present testimony that he was 
Clyde Lunceford's ("Clyde") personal attorney at the time, that he was retained by Clyde to 
assist in drafting the Settlement Agreement at Clyde's instructions, and that Clyde had not 
intended the Settlement Agreement to cut off Appellants' rights to the Trust. Appellants' 
counsel also noted that Jeffs had written letters to counsel for both sides setting forth these 
views, and counsel attempted to introduce those letters to the court. See R. at 484, p. 37. 
Mona's counsel objected to the introduction of either the letters or Jeffs' testimony, on the 
ground that extrinsic evidence was not admissible on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and the district 
court sustained the objection and refused to allow introduction of the evidence. Id. Thus, 
Mona is simply incorrect when she argues that Appellants did not ever try to introduce 
extrinsic evidence supporting their interpretation of the Settlement Agreement. 
Mona belittles these efforts, however, claiming that Appellants did not do enough to 
bring the matter to the attention of the district court, because Appellants did not ever argue, 
during the proceedings on the Motion to Dismiss, that the Settlement Agreement was 
"ambiguous." See Mona's Br., at 26. Rather, Appellants' arguments below had been that 
the Settlement Agreement unambiguously supported their interpretation. And that is the very 
definition of ambiguity: "[a] contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one 
reasonable interpretation." See Peterson, 2002 UT 43, f 19,48 P.3d 918: see also Ward, 907 
P.2d at 269 (same). If two parties are simultaneously arguing that a document can be 
interpreted unambiguously in their favor, yet advance two very different interpretations, the 
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document is by definition ambiguous as long as both proffered interpretations are reasonable 
and/or tenable. Appellants are aware of no authority requiring the parties to incant the magic 
word "ambiguous" in order for this to be true. When presented with two apparently tenable 
interpretations of the Settlement Agreement, the district court should have recognized that 
the Settlement Agreement was ambiguous. The fact that neither Appellants nor Mona ever 
argued, during the Rule 12(b)(6) proceedings, that the document was "ambiguous" is 
irrelevant. 
During the proceedings on the Motion to Reconsider, Appellants did argue that the 
Settlement Agreement was "ambiguous," and pointed out to the district court that this was 
so because both sides had advanced apparently tenable interpretations of the same document. 
But this did not appear to matter to the district court, which denied the motion to reconsider 
without even mentioning the Jeffs Affidavit or the "ambiguity" issue, because the court 
continued to believe that the Settlement Agreement was "plain on its face." See R. at 398. 
The district court erred by ruling, both on the initial Rule 12(b)(6) ruling and on the 
ruling denying the motion to reconsider, that the Settlement Agreement was unambiguous 
("plain on its face") and could be so interpreted without even considering relevant extrinsic 
evidence. In reality, case law obligated the district court to consider extrinsic 
evidence—including the letters and Jeffs' testimony—before determining that the Settlement 
Agreement was unambiguous. The district court's refusal to do so, based apparently upon 
a misunderstanding of Utah law, is reversible error. 
This error is especially evident in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. As the 
district court itself stated, "the Utah Supreme Court has indicated that a Rule 12(b)( 6) motion 
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to dismiss is proper if it clearly appears that a plaintiffcan prove no set of facts in support 
of his or her claims." See R. at 185 (citing Coleman v. Utah State Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622, 
624 (Utah 1990)) (emphasis added); see also Mackev v. Cannon. 2000 UT App 36, | 9 , 996 
P.2d 1081 (stating that a trial court's ruling dismissing a case under Rule 12(b)(6) "should 
be affirmed only if it clearly appears [that] the complainant can prove no set of facts in 
support of his or her claims"). By bringing to the court's attention Jeffs' letters and Jeffs' 
potential testimony, Appellants were demonstrating to the court that there was in fact a set 
of facts which, if proven, would support their claims. At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the district 
court was obligated to allow Appellants the opportunity to conduct discovery and prove up 
the set of facts made evident by Jeffs' testimony. 
C. The Jeffs Affidavit Is Admissible and Competent Evidence 
Mona argues, however, that the Jeffs Affidavit is inadmissible in any event, because, 
Mona claims, "a witness cannot speculate on the thought processes of another." See Mona's 
Br., at 25 (citing Pepper v. State. 558 N.E.2d 899, 900 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990)). Mona's 
argument is simply not well taken. As Utah case law amply demonstrates, it is quite routine 
in contested probate matters for an attorney, who formerly represented the deceased testator 
or settlor, to offer testimony about what the testator or settlor intended a document to mean. 
Such testimony is perfectly competent and admissible. Jeffs' affidavit is no different. 
Utah's appellate courts have long held that "an attorney [is] permitted to testify in an 
inquiry to ascertain, as between devisees under the client's will and a grantee claiming under 
a deed from the client made after the will, as to what was intended by the deed." See Webb 
v. Webb, 209 P.2d 201,204 (Utah 1949). Indeed, the court in Webb summed up the rule as 
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follows: 
Thus where, after the death of the client, litigation arises between parties all of 
whom claim under the client and the question to be determined is not the 
existence of a right of action against the estate, but the intention of the 
decedent as to creation of various rights which remain ambiguous, the attorney 
may testify. 
Id. This rule was more recently followed by the Utah Supreme Court. See Rentmeister v. 
DeSilva, 553 P.2d 411 (Utah 1976). In Rentmeister, the question to be decided was whether 
the settlor of a trust (now deceased) had intended that plaintiff receive $7,000 from the trust. 
The trial court allowed the settlor's attorney, who had drafted the trust documents, to testify 
at length about what the settlor intended, and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the decision 
of the trial court. 
In short, there is a long tradition of allowing attorneys for deceased settlors and 
devisors to testify in court, in contested probate matters, regarding what the deceased settlor 
or devisor intended. Jeffs' testimony is no different from the testimony allowed in Webb and 
Rentmeister. Jeffs was Clyde's personal attorney, and participated in numerous 
conversations with Clyde during the last years of his life during which Clyde confided in 
Jeffs regarding his intentions for the Trust. Jeffs was one of the two principal draftsmen of 
the Settlement Agreement, and consulted with Clyde about what that document ought to say, 
and had conversations with Clyde immediately after the drafting and signing of the 
Settlement Agreement in which Clyde told Jeffs that he still considered Appellants the 
residual beneficiaries of the Trust. See R. at 281-83. Jeffs' testimony on these points is 
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highly relevant and probative, and is perfectly competent and admissible.1 
D. The District Court's Determination that the Settlement Agreement Is 
Unambiguous in Mona's Favor Was Erroneous 
The district court's first error was refusing to consider Mr. Jeffs' testimony—clearly 
"relevant evidence"—in making its determination that the Settlement Agreement is 
unambiguous, as mandated by Ward and its progeny. The district court's second error was 
its actual determination that the Settlement Agreement is unambiguous in Mona's favor. 
When the entire document is examined, along with the parties' and Mr. Jeffs' respective 
interpretations, it becomes clear that the Settlement Agreement is, at a minimum, ambiguous, 
and cannot be interpreted as a matter of law in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 
1
 Mona also spends a great deal of time arguing that this Court cannot consider the Jeffs 
Affidavit because Appellants attached it to the documents filed in support of the Motion to 
Reconsider rather than to the documents filed in opposition to the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, 
reasoning that Appellants should not get "a second chance to present the facts." See Mona's 
Br., at 19-21. This argument may hold water in a summary judgment setting, where the 
parties have a full and fair opportunity to develop the factual record through discovery prior 
to litigating any motions for summary judgment. Indeed, every single one of the cases Mona 
cites in support of her argument on this point is a summary judgment case. See id. (citing 
cases). Mona does not, however, point this Court to a single authority holding that parties 
are forbidden from introducing new evidence on a motion to reconsider in the context of a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Appellants submit that this is because, in a Rule 12(b)(6) setting, the 
parties have not even had a first chance (let alone a second) to develop a factual record 
through discovery. By making Jeffs available for testimony during the hearing on the Rule 
12(b)(6) motion, and by submitting the Jeffs Affidavit, all that Appellants have done is to 
point out to the trial court that there is a set of facts that, if proven, would support their 
interpretation of the Settlement Agreement, and that therefore dismissal is improper under 
Rule 12(b)(6). Mona's authorities are not to the contrary, and do not prevent this Court from 
considering Jeffs' testimony. 
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1. Even without consideration of the Jeffs Affidavit, Appellants' 
interpretation is tenable and reasonable, while Mona's proffered 
interpretation is not. 
Even without taking Jeffs' testimony into account, Appellants' proffered interpretation 
is tenable and reasonable. Appellants pointed out to the district court that the phrases relied 
upon by Mona were intended to refer to an entirely separate claim by Appellants to the 
California Condominium and the Utah County Property—a claim, arising from a separate 
dispute with Clyde, that Appellants (rather than the Trust) had present fee simple entitlement 
to the property—and were not intended to refer to any rights Appellants may have had, or 
may have in the future, to inherit a remainder interest in the property through the Trust. This 
interpretation squares with Paragraph 4 of the Settlement Agreement, which states that 
Appellants will deliver a quit-claim deed to the Trust, and with Paragraph 5 of the Settlement 
Agreement, which explicitly reserves Clyde's right to use the Trust to bequeath any property 
to any person. When the language of the entire Settlement Agreement is examined together, 
it is clear that the intent of the parties was to have Appellants waive the other claims they had 
to the California Condominium and the Utah County Property, but not any rights they may 
have in the future to that same property through the Trust. 
Mona, for her part, focuses on isolated phrases in the Settlement Agreement to support 
her interpretation, and ignores several important provisions at odds with her interpretation 
(Paragraph 5, for instance, which expressly reserves Clyde's right to use the Trust to bequeath 
any property to any person, including Appellants). Mona relies heavily on the provision 
stating that Appellants waived "entitlement to present or immediate testamentary interests 
in the Coronado Condominium and the Clyde Residence," focusing largely on the word 
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"testamentary." See Mona's Br., at 29 (emphasis added) (arguing that the only 
"testamentary" interest Appellants had in the Trust assets was through the Trust). Mona 
blithely ignores, however, the words that come immediately before the word 
"testamentary"—"present and immediate." At the time of the Settlement Agreement, 
Appellants' interest in the Trust corpus through the Trust was hardly "present and 
immediate"; indeed, the Trust was revocable and Clyde (as affirmed by Paragraph 5) retained 
the right to change it at any time. Moreover, Appellants' interest was a remainder interest, 
to begin only after Mona had enjoyed her life estate. A remainder interest in revocable trust 
assets is hardly a "present and immediate" interest in anything. Accordingly, and as the 
"present and immediate" language indicates, Appellants intended to waive other more 
"present and immediate" claims to the Trust assets, not their claim through the Trust, which 
would ripen, if at all, at some indeterminate time in the future. 
In addition, the Settlement Agreement expressly recites, in the recitals, that Appellants 
are beneficiaries of the Trust. See R. at 084 (reciting that "[a]s of the date of execution of 
this Agreement, the Trustee [Jeffs] continues to serve as trustee of the Trust and the Trust 
beneficiaries are as stated in the Trust, as amended"). By signing the Settlement Agreement 
in January 2002, Mona agreed with that recital at the time. Yet later, and only after Clyde's 
death, Mona came forward with suspicious-looking documents allegedly signed by Clyde in 
2001 before the Settlement Agreement was executed that purport to eliminate Appellants' 
interest in the Trust. If Clyde had really agreed with Mona to give the entire Trust corpus to 
her and had signed the three 2001 documents so amending the Trust, that 2002 recital would 
have been incorrect and fraudulent. On the other hand, the existence of the recital confirms 
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Appellants' interpretation: that Appellants were still remainder beneficiaries under the Trust, 
and the Trust had not been amended to remove them.2 Thus, though the Settlement 
Agreement affirmatively states who the beneficiaries of the Trust were at the time, Mona 
claims that the Trust had actually been amended prior to that point, and, further, that the 
Settlement Agreement precludes anyone (including Appellants) from challenging her claim. 
Mona's interpretation is absurd, and does not square with the recitals. 
Finally, Mona relies heavily on the Settlement Agreement's release language, which 
Mona characterizes as "the most comprehensive general release ever drafted." See Mona's 
Br., at 30. This is a mischaracterization. The release clause (Paragraph 9) released the 
"Claims" and related causes of action—the "Claims" is a term defined elsewhere in the 
Settlement Agreement, and is to include the specific claims set forth in Recital I (including 
Appellants' claim of "present or immediate testamentary interests" in the Trust assets). 
Mona's arguments are therefore circular: the parties to this case hotly dispute whether 
Appellants' claims in this case are among the "Claims" waived in the Settlement Agreement, 
and therefore the Release clause in the Settlement Agreement cannot be used as support for 
Mona's particular side of that argument. If the Settlement Agreement, as a whole, was 
2
 Mona also argues that the Settlement Agreement was itself an implied amendment of 
the Trust, see Mona's Br., at 31-32, even though it does not so state, and even though it 
expressly left Clyde's right to tinker with the Trust unimpaired. Indeed, this portion of 
Mona's brief seems to indicate an uncertainty, on the part of Mona herself, with respect to 
how the Settlement Agreement can be reconciled with the continued existence of the Trust. 
See id- (arguing that the Agreement amended the Trust, but putting forth varied arguments 
regarding how and to what extent the Trust may have been amended). The reality is that the 
Settlement Agreement did not amend the Trust in any way; Appellants' proffered 
interpretation of the Settlement Agreement (as opposed to Mona's) can be fully squared with 
the continued existence of the Trust. 
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intended to cover the claims raised in this case, then they are waived; if the Settlement 
Agreement, as a whole, was not so intended, then the claims are not waived. 
Appearing to concede this, Mona next argues that the claims in this case are "related 
to" or "arise out o f the "Claims" waived in the Settlement Agreement, and are therefore 
released under Paragraph 9. See Mona's Br., at 30. This is absolutely false. This is the point 
that neither Mona nor the district court can seem to understand: the "Claims" waived in the 
Settlement Agreement had to do with long-simmering family disputes about the family LLC 
and other issues. The issues raised in this case have to do with, inter alia, whether Mona 
forged three documents purporting to grant her complete control over the Trust, and over 
whether Appellants are still remainder beneficiaries of the Trust. The two sets of claims are 
not related, and one does not arise out of the other. 
In short, even if one were to restrict review of the Settlement Agreement to the four 
corners of the document, the Agreement's actual terms are far more in line with Appellants' 
interpretation than they are with Mona's. Appellants' interpretation is, at a minimum, tenable 
and reasonable, and therefore the district court erred in construing the document against them 
as a matter of law on a Rule 12 motion. 
2. Consideration of "all relevant evidence," including the Jeffs 
Affidavit, cements Appellants' interpretation as the correct one. 
When one expands the inquiry, as commanded by the Utah Supreme Court, beyond 
the four comers of the document to "all relevant evidence," it becomes absolutely clear that 
the Settlement Agreement is, at a minimum, ambiguous, and that Appellants' interpretation 
is more than merely "tenable" or "reasonable." Indeed, it becomes clear that Appellants' 
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interpretation should ultimately prevail as the correct one. 
The Jeffs Affidavit is devastating to Mona. As soon as a court actually considers it, 
Mona's entire position on the Rule 12(b)(6) motion will fall apart. Appellants suspect that 
this is why Mona spends so much of her brief arguing that the Jeffs Affidavit is "prejudicial" 
and should not be considered by either this Court or the trial court. If this case is remanded 
for discovery, Jeffs will be deposed, and will testify, inter alia, about the conversations he 
had with Clyde wherein Clyde still considered Appellants residual beneficiaries of the Trust, 
even after execution of the Settlement Agreement. Jeffs will also testify about his grave 
suspicions of Mona and the mysterious appearance, immediately after Clyde's death, of the 
three 2001 documents. Jeffs will also testify that he had a large role in drafting the 
Settlement Agreement upon Clyde's instructions, and that the parties to that Agreement did 
not intend to amend the Trust or waive any of the claims that Appellants brought below. 
In fact, this is a case that proves the wisdom of the rule announced in Ward. The 
district court, using its own lens and its own preconceived notions of the meaning of words, 
ruled that Appellants had waived their claims to Ihe Trust assets, and ruled that the document 
was unambiguous on this point. However, despite the district court's apparent certainty 
regarding the meaning of the document, the available extrinsic evidence clearly indicates that 
the parties intended something different. If courts are truly to give effect and meaning to the 
parties' intent—the supposed touchstone of contractual interpretation and enforcement—the 
available evidence regarding that intent must be considered. 
If the district court had considered Jeffs' testimony, it would have been impossible for 
it to conclude that the Settlement Agreement was unambiguous in Mona's favor. In reality, 
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Jeffs' affidavit establishes Appellants' interpretation as the correct one, or, at a bare 
minimum, makes Appellants' interpretation "tenable" and "reasonable" for the purposes of 
an ambiguity determination, and makes it impossible for the district court to construe the 
Settlement Agreement in Mona's favor on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 
Thus, the district court's determination that the Settlement Agreement was 
unambiguous, and could be interpreted as a matter of law in Mona's favor on a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion, was erroneous and should be reversed. At a minimum, the Settlement Agreement 
is ambiguous, and therefore its interpretation must await discovery and testimony regarding 
its meaning. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES TO 
MONA 
Finally, the district court should not have awarded attorneys' fees to Mona. The 
district court's award of attorneys' fees was based on an erroneous ruling that the Settlement 
Agreement could be unambiguously interpreted in Mona's favor on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 
This ruling is wrong, and should be reversed for the reasons set forth above. Because Mona 
should not have been the prevailing party on the motion, the district court's award of 
attorneys' fees in Mona's favor should be reversed as well. 
Mona contends, however, that even if the district court's decision is reversed, "Mona 
would still be entitled to some attorney's fees," because "Appellants have brought many more 
claims [in their Complaint] than they have chosen to defend in this appeal." See Mona's Br., 
at 34. This argument is misguided, for the reasons stated above, in part LB. The district 
court did not rule on the merits of Appellants' individual affirmative claims (e.g., that Scott 
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rather than Mona is the successor trustee, and that the three 2001 documents are not 
authentic); rather, the court simply ruled that all of Appellants' individual affirmative claims 
were waived under the "unambiguous" terms of the Settlement Agreement. Appellants 
cannot appeal issues not decided below, and therefore did not burden the appellate record 
with such issues. This does not and cannot result in a waiver. If the district court's decision 
is reversed, Appellants' entire Complaint will be reinstated, and Appellants will be free to 
argue and prove their claims as pleaded. No final judgment will, in that instance, have been 
rendered in favor of anyone, and Mona will have no entitlement to attorneys' fees on any 
issue. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the district court's orders granting Mona's Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, as well as the order denying Appellants' Motion to Reconsider, 
should be reversed, and the attendant order granting Mona attorneys' fees and costs should 
also be reversed. This case should be remanded for further proceedings, including discovery 
as to the intent and meaning of the Settlement Agreement, and trial. 
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